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The performance of group-affiliated firms during institutional transition: A 
longitudinal study of Indian firms 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: Institutional and transaction cost theories highlight the idea that 
group-affiliated firms outperform unaffiliated firms in emerging economies. However, the 
persistence of superior performance among group-affiliated firms could be challenged by the 
recent, quick development of markets and institutions in these countries. This article explores 
the link between firm performance and the evolution of the institutional environment.  
Research Findings/Insights: We analyze how business group affiliation affected firm 
performance in India in the post-reform era, i.e. from 1990 to 2006. Our findings show that: 
(i) the performance benefits of group affiliation are evident in the early phase of institutional 
transition but level out in the late phase; (ii) older group-affiliated firms are better able to cope 
with institutional transition than younger group-affiliated firms; and (iii) group-affiliated 
service firms are better able to cope with institutional transition than group-affiliated 
manufacturing firms. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings support both the institutional and 
transaction cost theories of business groups, and extend them by adding a two-phase 
longitudinal component. The findings also highlight the fact that the benefits of group 
membership vary for different firms in the group, which is in line with other recent studies. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The article has implications for managers and policy 
makers. Managers of business groups should adapt the timing of strategies to the evolution of 
the institutional environment. Policy makers should focus on the consequences of their 
policies, as they may undermine the efficiency of large national companies.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Business Groups; India  
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The performance of group-affiliated firms during institutional transition: A 
longitudinal study of Indian firms 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Business groups are the dominant organizational form in emerging economies. A business 
group consists of individual firms with multiple links through which the firms are coordinated 
in order to achieve common goals (Granovetter, 1994; Leff, 1978; Strachan, 1976). Although 
business group characteristics differ across countries, business groups have two particular 
traits that distinguish them from other organizational forms − the existence of multiple ties 
among individual firms and the presence of an administrative center aimed at coordinating 
group-affiliated firms (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  
Studies of business groups were fragmented until recently. However, there has been a 
growing interest among management and organizational scholars in this subject, especially as 
it pertains to emerging economies (e.g. Chang and Hong, 2002; Guillen, 2000; Keister, 1998; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). In emerging economies, capital, labor 
and product markets are characterized by high imperfections, and business groups are seen as 
organizational solutions for resolving the problems that arise from an inadequate institutional 
environment (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, and Hong, 2004). 
According to the institutional and transaction cost theories, business groups act as a substitute 
for missing external institutions, and they create an efficient business environment for 
affiliated firms. With some exceptions, mostly related to Japanese groups, the empirical 
evidence supports the view that business groups are efficient mechanisms for resolving 
market imperfections (e.g. Chang and Choi, 1988; Keister, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1999 
and 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
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Previous studies of groups have analyzed the relationship between business group 
affiliation and firm performance, usually at a single point in time. The more advanced, cross-
sectional studies either compare the performance effects of business group affiliation across a 
number of emerging countries (e.g. Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), or compare the performance 
effects of business group affiliation in emerging and developed economies (e.g. Chachar and 
Vissa, 2005). With few exceptions (e.g. Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), studies 
have not investigated whether institutional transition could change the positive effect that 
business group affiliation has on firm performance (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). This is a 
relevant question, as institutional transitions, i.e. fundamental and comprehensive institutional 
changes, modify the rules of the game and affect company behavior and performance (e.g. 
North, 1990; Peng, 2003).  
Therefore, this article investigates the impact of the evolution of the institutional 
environment on the performance of group-affiliated firms. Following institutional and 
transaction cost theories, we hypothesize that group-affiliated firms benefit from a superior 
form of governance in the early phase of institutional transition, but they lose their advantage 
to unaffiliated firms in the late phase. In line with several recent studies, we also hypothesize 
that the impact of institutional evolution will vary for different group-affiliated firms. More 
specifically, we hypothesize that younger firms and service group-affiliated firms are better 
able to cope with institutional transition than older firms and manufacturing group-affiliated 
firms. 
To test the longitudinal two-phase model of institutional transition (Peng, 2003), we 
collected data on Indian firms over a 17-year period. The Indian context is particularly 
appropriate for our purpose for several reasons. First, Indian groups are particularly diffused 
and it is relatively easy to identify firms belonging to the different groups. Second, India has 
undergone institutional transition since the early 1990s, which provides for a sufficiently long 
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period in which to analyze the hypothesized relationships. Since our panel data combines 
time-series and cross-sectional data, we use time-series, cross-sectional regression analyses to 
test our models.  
Our findings show that as the institutional environment evolves: (i) the performance 
benefits of group affiliation slowly erode, i.e. an affiliated firm’s superior performance 
persists in the early phase and levels out in the late phase of institutional transition; (ii) older 
group-affiliated firms outperform younger group-affiliated firms; and (iii) group-affiliated 
service firms outperform group affiliated manufacturing firms. Our study has significant 
theoretical and empirical implications. First, our findings support the institutional and 
transaction cost theories of business groups, and extend these theories by adding a two-phase 
longitudinal component. Second, in line with recent research, our findings suggest that the 
benefits of group membership differ for different member firms. 
This article has four sections. In the first section, we introduce the main characteristics of 
business groups, develop our theoretical hypotheses and discuss institutional evolution in 
India. In the second, we present the methods as they relate to the sample, data collection, 
variables and data analysis. The third section summarizes the results of the statistical 
analyses. Finally, we conclude the article with a discussion of implications and limitations in 
the fourth section.  
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Definition and characteristics of business groups  
“Business groups” are the dominant organizational form in emerging economies. A business 
group is a collection of legally independent firms that are linked together through multiple 
ties, which can include cross-ownership, strict market exchanges and social relationships 
(such as those among influential actors, such as owners or managers). Group-affiliated firms 
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are coordinated through these ties in order to achieve common goals (Granovetter, 1994; Leff, 
1978; Strachan, 1976). This definition captures two particular features of business groups − 
the presence of multiple ties holding group firms together and the existence of coordinated 
actions enabled by those ties (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  
These two features differentiate business groups from other organizational forms, such as 
independent firms or strategic networks (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Yiu, Lu, Bruton and 
Hoskisson, 2007), in several ways. First, group-affiliated firms are bound together by various 
overlapping ties, such as cross-ownership, interlocking directorates, market transactions, 
inter-company loans and social relationships (Goto, 1982). The social and organizational 
relationships among actors (such as shareholders and managers) that tie member firms 
together do not exist among independent firms. Second, a core entity (e.g. the founding 
owner, a financial institution, or a state-owned enterprise) inside business groups usually 
offers administrative control or managerial coordination to affiliated firms (Leff, 1978; 
Strachan, 1976). For example, in the largest business group in India, the Tata group of 
companies, Tata Sons is the core entity responsible for the control and coordination of 
member firms. Strategic networks do not have a core entity coordinating the operations of 
member firms. 
Business groups are far from uniform across countries. The labels used to define business 
groups differ. For example, Japanese groups are called “keiretsu”, Latin American groups are 
known as “grupos economicos” and South Korean groups are called “chaebols” (Granovetter, 
1994). Furthermore, the characteristics of business groups differ across countries (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007). Business groups vary along many dimensions, such as the types of ties among 
affiliated firms (i.e. cross-shareholdings, personal relationships, market exchanges), and in 
terms of the intensity of coordination inside the group. Due to these differences, the 
definitions and characteristics of business groups are highly contingent on the institutional 
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contexts in which they operate. It is therefore somewhat difficult to compare research work on 
business groups in various settings because the phenomena under investigation may be 
substantially different (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007).  
 
Theoretical framework for investigating business groups in emerging economies 
The most popular theoretical explanations for the widespread diffusion of business groups in 
emerging economies are the institutional and transaction cost theories, which are 
complementary. Institutional theory underlines the view that emerging economies are 
characterized by ineffective institutions and high imperfections in the markets for capital, 
labor, and products (North, 1990 and 1991). Transaction cost theory suggests that the 
internalization of transactions inside business groups may resolve problems arising from these 
market failures (Williamson, 1975, 1985 and 1991). 
Institutional theory. Institutional theory emphasizes the influence of socio-cultural norms 
and values, as well as the effect of law and the judicial system, on organizational structure and 
behavior (North, 1990). Institutions are the formal (e.g. political rules, economic rules and 
contracts) and informal (e.g. codes of conduct, norms of behavior and convention) constraints 
that regulate economic activities and human behavior. Informal constraints are embedded in a 
culture and play a role when formal constraints fail (North, 1990). Institutions limit the set of 
choices individuals and organizations have, thereby providing a stable structure for economic 
exchanges and reducing uncertainty (North, 1990).  
Institutions and the effectiveness of enforcement determine the cost of a transaction. 
Effective institutions increase the benefits derived from cooperative solutions, while 
ineffective institutions increase the benefits derived from defection (North, 1991). Institutions 
evolve incrementally, and the story of an economy’s performance can be seen as a story of 
institutional evolution (North, 1991). In sum, according to this theory: (i) the national 
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institutional context has a significant impact on rules of competition, firm strategy, and 
performance, and (ii) a more efficient institutional context favors market exchanges and the 
growth of the national economy (e.g. North, 1990; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). 
Transaction cost theory. In transaction cost theory, markets and organizations are seen as 
alternative mechanisms for managing the exchange of goods, services and financial resources 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975 and 1985). Markets and hierarchies are polar modes. Markets 
provide higher incentives, and favor rapid, independent adaptation to external changes. 
Hierarchies have stronger administrative controls, and they manage adaptation properly if 
bilateral dependency is present (Williamson, 1991). Managers must adopt transaction cost-
economizing strategies − they must choose the organizational form that minimizes the costs 
implicit in the transaction (Williamson, 1975). When institutions are developed and efficient, 
the market acts as a superior form of governance. When institutions are underdeveloped and 
inefficient, a hierarchy produces better results (Williamson, 1985).  
In addition to these pure forms, the transaction cost literature acknowledges the existence 
and growing diffusion of intermediate organizational forms (Williamson, 1991). Intermediate 
forms include long-term contracts, franchising, joint ventures, and business groups. These 
governance forms, also denoted as “hybrids”, display intermediate characteristics relative to 
the pure forms. Hybrids are, in fact, characterized by semi-strong incentives and 
administrative control, and by semi-strong adaptation to the two types of changes 
(Williamson, 1991). Intermediate forms are particularly diffused when institutions are not 
developed and efficient, but some control may avoid abuses from the counterpart, and when 
there is the need for some incentives to foster efficient behavior among the actors involved in 
the transaction (Williamson, 1991).  
 
Effect of group affiliation in emerging economies prior to major institutional transition 
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Emerging economies are traditionally characterized by high imperfections in the markets for 
capital, final and intermediate products, and managerial and entrepreneurial talent (e.g. Caves, 
1989; Khanna, Palepu and Sinha, 2005; Leff, 1976; Peng and Heath, 1996). In this context, 
transactions may be particularly costly because formal institutions for trade and contract 
enforcement are weak, and partners involved in a trade are exposed to opportunistic behavior 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). The presence of information and contracting problems arising 
from weak market institutions allows the internal market and group structures to create value. 
In the absence of specialized intermediaries providing trade, enforcement and communication 
services, there is an opportunity for groups with the appropriate resources and capabilities to 
fill the “institutional voids” (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
According to institutional and transaction cost theories, business groups may be seen as an 
organizational solution for problems arising from market failures and an inadequate 
institutional environment (e.g. Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1982; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kim 
et al., 2004). Business groups are created in emerging economies to reduce the high 
transaction costs in markets for capital (Berglof and Perotti, 1994; Caves and Uekusa, 1976; 
Daems, 1978; Leff, 1978; Strachan, 1976), entrepreneurial skills (Leff, 1978), intermediate 
products (Goto, 1982; Kester, 1992), labor (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), and political lobbies 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Therefore, business groups may be seen as organizational and 
administrative devices that aim to reduce the high transactions costs arising from market 
imperfections (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
In line with the institutional and transaction cost explanation, some scholars argue that 
members of a business group can create value through the sharing of the group’s valuable 
resources (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Empirical evidence shows that firms affiliated with 
business groups freely share intangible resources, such as R&D, advertising or reputation 
(Chang and Hong, 2002). Moreover, business groups may share key personnel and talented 
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managers, and provide their employees with extensive managerial and technical training 
(Chang and Hong, 2000). Business groups may produce better economic performance by 
mobilizing intangible resources and human resources across firms, especially in the early 
stage of economic development when market institutions are poorly developed. At that stage, 
they are in a better strategic position to control they key resources in product and factor 
markets necessary for the smooth functioning of day-to-day operations. Moreover, group-
affiliated firms have broader, relatively easy access to capital, both internal and foreign, and 
can access labor and product markets at a lower cost than firms that are not part of a business 
group (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
Group affiliation not only involves benefits but also costs. Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
mention at least three sources of costs. First, there could be a conflict of interest between the 
controlling majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, which could result in a 
misallocation of capital and cross-subsidization of unprofitable ventures by the profitable 
ones (Zattoni, 1999). Second, there could be inefficient compensation schemes across group 
firms, as holding companies can move internal resources among group firms either for 
efficiency or equity reasons. Third, decisions made at the head office may be suboptimal, as it 
is difficult to acquire expertise in multiple domains at the same time. Chu (2004) suggests that 
other costs of group affiliation may arise out of the information processing limits of 
organizations and top management.  
Despite the presence of some costs for group affiliation, the general view is that the 
benefits of group membership outweigh the costs in emerging economies. Empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that firms belonging to a group in an emerging economy show better 
financial performance than independent firms. Affiliated firms outperform unaffiliated firms 
in Korea (Chang and Choi, 1988), Chile and India (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). A recent study 
investigating the in-country performance effects of business groups in 14 emerging 
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economies shows that group-affiliated firms outperform unaffiliated firms in the majority of 
countries (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Only in Japan, a developed economy, have members of 
bank-centered groups been shown to underperform comparable unaffiliated firms for many 
years (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
In summary, theory and empirical evidence concur that business groups have beneficial 
effects in emerging economies. The institutional and transaction cost theories suggest that 
business groups may improve the profitability of member firms by filling the voids left by the 
lack of institutions that otherwise ensure the efficient functioning of product, capital, and 
labor markets (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kim et al., 2004). Empirical evidence provides 
ample support for the idea that business groups serve as organizational responses to the 
particular institutional context of emerging economies (e.g. Chang and Choi, 1988; Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  
 
Effect of group affiliation in emerging economies in the early phase of institutional 
transition 
The institutional environment evolves through marginal adjustments over time (North, 1990: 
83). Although institutions evolve throughout relatively long periods of equilibrium, their 
development is sometimes punctuated by institutional transitions (Peng, 2003). Institutional 
transitions are “fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and 
informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players” (Peng, 2003: 275). Large-scale 
institutional transitions imply a deinstitutionalization, i.e. the erosion or the discontinuity of 
an institutionalized organizational practice (Oliver, 1992). The deinstitutionalization erodes 
and challenges existing organizational routines and competencies, and may undermine the 
beneficial effects of business group affiliation.  
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Peng (2003) develops a two-phase model of market-oriented institutional transitions. He 
observes that market-oriented institutional transitions imply a movement from one primary 
mode of exchange, known as relationship-based contracting, to another mode, known as rule-
based contracting, in order to reduce uncertainty. In the first phase, the transition introduces 
uncertainty, as new institutions emerge to replace old ones (Oliver, 1992). In the short run, the 
transactions are still dominated by the relationship-based structure, but they gradually move 
to a rule-based structure in the long run. The long period of incremental evolution may be 
explained by the lack of credible enforcement of the new rules, and the inertia and resistance 
emanating from existing organizational routines (North, 1990; Oliver, 1992; Peng, 2003).  
The evolution of market institutions leads to an improvement in business competition (Luo 
and Chung, 2005). Deregulation and privatization remove obstacles to resource mobility and 
market competition, creating a number of business opportunities. The value of business 
groups’ internal market capabilities declines over time as market institutions develop in the 
national economic system (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Peng, 2003). However, in the early 
phase of transition, the market infrastructures remain relatively underdeveloped. The void in 
market institutions for labor, capital, and products still creates uncertainty and ambiguity for 
organizations (Peng, 2003).  
There is a time lag between the removal of restrictive policies and the establishment of 
effective market institutions. The development of market institutions usually takes longer 
because of the presence of strict interrelationships among them (Aoki and Kim, 1995). In the 
early phase of institutional transition, competition intensifies and underdeveloped market 
infrastructures are present (Gemawhat and Khanna, 1998). During this phase, uncertainties in 
formal institutional constraints often lead managers to rely on informal and interpersonal 
relationships (Peng and Heath, 1996). As the economy develops and transactions become 
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more specialized, informal dealings based on relationships are likely to be the most efficient 
way of exchange, as formal institutions are still absent (Peng, 2003).  
Some empirical studies of emerging economies indicate that group-affiliated firms still 
outperform unaffiliated firms in the early phase of transition. These studies show that business 
groups react to the evolution of the institutional environment by increasing their efficiency 
and improving their performance in the short term (e.g. Kedia et al., 2006; Luo and Chung, 
2005). This is possible through strategic actions, such as exiting from some peripheral 
businesses, making significant investments in new lines of business opened by liberalization, 
and strengthening internal structures and processes to heighten the group’s role as an 
intermediary (Chang and Hong, 2000; Guillen, 2000; Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 
1999 and 2000; Luo and Chung, 2005).  
We hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: In the early phase of institutional transition, the performance of group-
affiliated firms is higher than the performance of unaffiliated firms. 
 
Effect of group affiliation in the late phase of institutional transition 
In the early phase of institutional transition, new players – such as entrepreneurial start-ups 
and foreign entrants – introduce new norms of competition centered on capability 
development. Until new formal rules are introduced and reinforced, this rule-based structure 
is not particularly efficient and has little influence on incumbents (Peng, 2003). However, as 
the transition unfolds, new firms become central players, making market-based competition 
the new institutionalized way of managing transactions (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King, 
1991).  
Later in the process, institutional transition typically results in increased openness towards 
cross-border trade and investment, and competitive pressures from foreign multinational 
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companies increase (Lee, Peng and Lee, 2008). Capital markets become better regulated, and 
more open and transparent. At the same time, labor and product markets become more 
competitive. Finally, the development of market intermediaries in the capital, labor, and 
product markets favors a rule-based structure and undermines relationship-based dealings 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1999). 
With institutional transition, information progressively flows more freely in the economy, 
contract enforcement becomes more efficient, and market imperfections and transaction costs 
are drastically reduced. In these circumstances, the group’s benefits in terms of overcoming 
imperfections in capital, product, and labor markets decrease substantially (Guillen, 2000; 
Kim, Hoskisson and Wan, 2004). The evolution of institutional environments inevitably 
diminishes the value-creating potential of business groups by introducing internal capital, 
labor, and product markets across the affiliated firms (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). However, 
despite the pressure exerted by formal market-supporting institutions to change strategy, 
business groups are slower than unaffiliated firms to move from relationship-based to rule-
based competition because they are deeply embedded in the old institutions (Oliver, 1992; 
Peng, 2003).  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The superior performance of group-affiliated firms relative to unaffiliated firms 
levels out, over time, in the late phase of institutional transition.  
 
Impact of firm characteristics on the performance effect of group affiliation in emerging 
economies 
Studies of business groups are traditionally based on the premise that the benefits and costs of 
group affiliation are equally shared among member firms (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). These studies measure firm performance, discriminating between 
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group-affiliated companies and independent companies, as they focus on the value creation 
potential of groups relative to independent companies.  
In line with some recent studies (e.g. Jameson, Sullivan and Constand, 2000; Kim, 
Hoskisson, and Wan, 2004), this study goes beyond the implicit assumption of homogeneity 
of the group effect and explores whether group-affiliated benefits differ for different member 
firms. In particular, we investigate whether firm age and industry competitiveness have an 
impact on the group effect, as these variables may play an important role in institutional 
transitions. Older group-affiliated firms may be more prone to strategic inertia than younger 
group-affiliated firms, and they may be less flexible in terms of adapting to changing external 
conditions (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Newman, 2000; Yiu, Bruton, and Lu, 2005). In India, 
group-affiliated service firms may be better able to cope with institutional transition than 
group-affiliated manufacturing firms because the Indian service industry has traditionally 
been more competitive and efficient than the Indian manufacturing industry (Kapur and 
Ramamurti, 2001; Porter, 1990).  
Firm age and group effect. The “time-period of existence” can affect the firm’s distinct 
bundle of critical resources and organizational skills. Consequently, it may influence the 
firm’s financial performance. In general, the higher the age of the company, the greater the 
firm’s embeddedness and legitimacy in the institutional environment (Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 
2005).  
The institutional transition implies that this legitimacy is no longer valid, as the 
institutional context moves from relationship-based to market-based rules of competition 
(Peng, 2003). The transition requires the development of “strategic flexibility”, which helps 
firms take advantage of new opportunities (Uhlenbruck, Meyer and Hitt, 2003). Firms formed 
during a certain period are imprinted with the social, cultural, and technical features 
prevailing in the external environment (Stinchcombe, 1965). Such imprinting may be highly 
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resistant to change and is likely to affect firms throughout their life cycle. Old firms are more 
prone to strategic inertia than young firms, and they are less flexible in terms of adapting to 
changing external conditions (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  
The extent of a firm’s embeddedness in old institutions may be problematic in terms of 
long-term performance and may even challenge a firm’s survival (Newman, 2000). In other 
words, older firms formed in response to policy distortions would perform worse when such 
distortions vanish and institutions evolve. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Younger group-affiliated firms are better able to cope with institutional 
transition than older group-affiliated firms. 
 
Industry competitiveness and group effect. The competitiveness of industries and the 
development of market-based institutions are related (Peng. 2003). In other words, the more 
competitive an industry, the more advanced the development of market-supporting 
institutions in that industry. The degree of competitiveness of industries within a nation is far 
from uniform (Porter, 1990). Some industries may be competitive and integrated in the 
international arena, while others may be regulated and local (Porter, 1990). In this respect, 
India shows surprising strength in skill-intensive tradable services, while Indian 
manufacturing does not demonstrate a similar dynamism (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2001). The 
development of Indian software and service firms rests on the intensive use of resources 
(human capital and physical infrastructure) in which the country enjoys an international 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1990). Rivalry in the Indian software industry has been strong 
because it has not been subject to industrial licensing from the central government and 
policies have been supportive of a software industry. In addition, the formation of new 
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ventures has been fueled by local and overseas Indians who have started new companies or 
supplied venture capital (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2001).  
In India, knowledge-intensive services such as software, IT, engineering, and healthcare, 
also dominate international expansion. Some emerging economies are not only beginning to 
develop a significant share of service exports and FDI, but they are also doing so at far higher 
growth rates than in manufacturing (Braga, 1996; Svetlicic and Rojec, 2003). These sectors 
are less prone to severe adaptation or assimilation costs given the standard nature of the 
offerings. Furthermore, the social and relational capital has been effective in providing know-
how, market access, capital, and overall guidance, even abroad (Kapur and Ramamurti, 2001). 
In the majority of service sub-sectors, such as information technology, advertising, and 
engineering services, the comparative capital costs are lower, and operations can be scaled up 
or replicated at home or in foreign locations fairly easily. In sum, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Group-affiliated service firms are better able to cope with institutional 
transition than group-affiliated manufacturing firms.  
 
METHOD 
Institutional evolution in India 
Discontinuous and fundamental changes are peculiar characteristics of emerging economies. 
These countries offer a natural, experimental condition in which to explore the impact of the 
emergence of new formal and informal rules on the strategy and performance of group and 
independent firms (Peng, 2003; Scott, 1995). 
India serves as a classic example of an emerging economy undergoing institutional 
transition. Liberal trade and FDI policies have been steadily introduced since the early 1990’s. 
Prior to the start of the liberalization process in 1991, India had many market imperfections 
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(Douma, George and Kabir, 2006). First, the market for corporate control was almost absent. 
There were legal restrictions on the acquisition of shares, and the domestic financial 
institutions were passive. Second, many Indian corporations were managed by family 
members, which meant that the market for corporate managers was far from effective. Third, 
the product market was shielded from foreign competition by tariffs and other regulations. In 
general, the characteristics of the capital, managerial, and product markets were typical of an 
emerging economy (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Kedia et al., 2006). 
In India’s economic history, the liberalization drive initiated in 1990-1991 can be 
characterized as a watershed event, which fundamentally changed the competitive landscape 
for domestic firms. The liberalization was brought about through widespread market reforms, 
reduction of licenses and regulations, and private participation in state-owned enterprises in a 
variety of industries. Although the 1990-1991 liberalization served as an exogenous shock in 
the form of comprehensive institutional reforms (Chittoor, Sarkar, Ray and Aulakh, 2009) 
with long-term consequences on firm strategy and structure, two aspects of this liberalization 
drive are relevant to this study. First, the economic reforms undertaken on the governmental 
level in 1990-91 were not immediately matched by regulatory policy changes on the ground 
level (Virmani, 2004). The bureaucracy that plagued most government offices in India 
ensured a lag between the formulation of reforms and policies, and actual institutionalization 
on the ground level. Such delays in keeping up with policy and regulatory reforms, along with 
administrative hassles, had a negative impact on investors’ enthusiasm during the initial phase 
of institutional evolution after 1991. Second, the 1990-1991 reforms marked only the 
beginning of the liberalization drive in the Indian economy. This process has continued and is 
far from complete, primarily due to the political constraints imposed by coalition 
governments (Elango and Pattnaik, 2007), a consistent feature of the Indian government over 
the last two decades. Therefore, we posit that although 1990-1991 brought the biggest 
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changes in the institutional evolution of India, the effects could only begin to be observed a 
few years later, at which point the scope of the liberalization drive gained momentum. We 
select 1995-1996 as the timeframe for when the latter phase of the institutional evolution 
commenced. While a detailed review of the institutional reforms and policies is beyond the 
scope of this article, we would like to highlight several important events that reinforce the 
choice of 1995-1996 as the dividing line between the two phases of institutional evolution in 
India.  
The Indian capital market was largely underdeveloped, with illiquid equity markets, 
nationalized banks and a weak monitoring system (Khanna and Palepu, 1997 and 2000), but 
went through major reforms in 1990-1991. However, incidents of insider trading, stock 
market scandals and other similar capital frauds were seen following the reforms (Goswami, 
2002). In 1992, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) was made a statutory 
body responsible for regulating the capital markets, but SEBI was not empowered to regulate 
all capital market intermediaries until 1995-1996. The first formal corporate governance 
committee was only established in 1996. Since then, a number of committees have been 
formed to provide recommendations on important corporate governance matters, such as 
board composition and procedures, the constitution of audit committees, and shareholder 
rights (Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). The Ministry of Finance and SEBI cooperated in the 
introduction of regulations on all aspects of the capital markets, and both drew on global 
norms and expertise. In August 1994, India accepted IMF Article VIII, whereby the Indian 
rupee became officially convertible on the current account, allowing foreign institutional 
investors to more freely take money out of India. This, in turn, increased confidence in the 
Indian economy. Another notable change was establishment of electronic trading in 1994. All 
of these changes resulted in a stock market boom in India around the mid-1990’s. Firms could 
access capital through equity markets that were more developed and better regulated than ever 
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before. This particularly benefited small, unaffiliated firms that did not otherwise have many 
options to finance their operations. 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, adopted several decontrol measures 
and regulatory reforms in its efforts to remove policy distortions in the banking sector 
following the 1991 liberalization. Most of the previous policy framework was dismantled, 
although there were few immediate changes in terms of government ownership of banks and 
credit allocation conditions (Virmani, 2004). After 1995-1996, RBI opened up to outside 
input and consultation from the Finance ministry, local experts and global financial 
institutions. After this shift, significant private investment, including investment from foreign 
players, started spread in the banking industry. Bank financing became more readily 
available, and it came at cheaper rates for domestic firms, which helped those firms that did 
not operate under the umbrella of larger business groups. 
Until the 1991 reforms, the Indian product market was characterized by limited 
enforcement of liability laws, little dissemination of information and a lack of activist 
consumers (Khanna and Palepu, 1997 and 2000). This was largely the result of a lack of 
competition, ensured by strict licensing requirements and high tariffs, which prohibited 
domestic and foreign private investment. As part of the 1990-1991 reforms, licensing 
requirements were abolished, except for licenses for firms in defense and industries that could 
damage the environment. FDI of up to 51% equity was allowed in select industries (Bhaumik, 
Gangopadhyay and Krishnan, 2008). This led to a spurt in private participation in a range of 
industries, which created greater competition. In 1996, the value of equity of private firms 
finally exceeded that of state-owned enterprises (Majumdar, 2008), which reflected the 
growing private participation in the Indian economy. 
In the 1990’s, tax and trade policy reforms were instrumental in boosting consumption and 
corporate investment, which then led to increased competition in the product market. Taxes 
 20 
were reduced across board − the boldest reduction occurred in 1997-98 when the peak 
personal income tax rate was lowered to 30% and the corporate tax was lowered to 35% from 
the 1980’s highs of 56% and 52%, respectively (Virmani, 2004). While this created relatively 
more disposable income for personal consumption, it also enabled firms, particularly smaller 
ones, to retain larger portions of their profits for investment purposes. On the trade policy 
front, a major import policy reform in 1995 put 78 consumer goods into the “freely 
importable” category. In addition, the peak rate for import tariffs was reduced from 85% in 
1993-94 to 50% in 1995 and to 40% in 1997-98 (Virmani, 2004). These reforms resulted in a 
more competitive product market with a significant increase in the dissemination of corporate 
information.  
Prior to the 1990-91 reforms, the Indian labor market was characterized by inflexibility, a 
scarcity of management talent, few opportunities for training, and the presence of few 
business schools (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000). Labor market reforms have since been 
introduced, albeit slowly. The laws governing employment contracts in India are some of the 
strictest in the world, but they only apply to the organized manufacturing sector, where they 
restrict labor mobility and force the organized sector to become capital-intensive. 
Manufacturing plants with more than 100 employees need government permission to lay off 
even one worker. However, this rule does not apply to establishments in the service sector. In 
addition, protection for temporary workers, workers on fixed-term contracts and for smaller 
firms (less than 100 employees) in all sectors is similar to the OECD average (OECD, 2007).  
In terms of institutions of higher education, India has made significant progress since 1991. 
The number of academic institutions for higher learning more than doubled from 6,761 in 
1991 to 14,143 in 2003. This resulted in a much larger pool of qualified workers in India. The 
number of doctoral degrees awarded in science and engineering increased by 81% from 5,049 
in 1996 to 9,131 in 2000 (www.indiastat.com). According to a survey undertaken by The 
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Economist, India was ahead of China, the US, the EU and Japan in terms of the total number 
of university graduates in science and engineering from 2002 to 2004. All of these changes 
resulted in a much higher employment growth rate in the 2000-2006 time period, reflecting 
the upward shift of India’s labor market performance (Dougherty, 2008). 
Clearly, the liberalization drive led to the globalization of product, labor and capital 
markets, which in turn affected the way Indian firms governed themselves. Specifically, 
unaffiliated firms started to change their corporate governance systems to align with global 
governance standards (Khanna and Palepu, 2004). On the other hand, business group-
affiliated firms continued to depend on their internal product, labor and capital markets and 
did not feel pressured to comply with the global corporate governance standards. One case 
representing the former is Infosys and, more generally, the Indian software sector, where 
many firms started to raise money from the capital markets in India and abroad. In order to do 
so, they had to be more transparent and follow the same governance mechanisms as publicly 
listed firms in the west.  
 
Sample and variables 
The data used in this study covers 547 Indian firms over a 17 year period (1990 to 2006). The 
list of firms was derived from the 2006 edition of the annual database, Prowess, which is 
compiled by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE)1. The database covers the 
majority of public Indian firms and is compiled by CMIE using audited annual reports that are 
provided by the firms. The Prowess database provides information on the identity of the 
owner(s), through which one can identify whether a firm is business group- affiliated, foreign-
owned or privately held. In addition, the database also provides a range of financial 
information on the firms.  
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Following along the lines of previous studies (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000), this study 
focuses on a consistent sample of firms for which there was 17 years of complete data and for 
which group affiliation was stable over time. Robustness checks were undertaken with 
broader samples. This sample allowed us to compare the same firms over time (i.e. the firm 
variation is constant), and it was not affected by entries and exits, which made it possible to 
distinguish the effects of institutional changes on firm behavior and performance.   
After cleaning the data and accounting for missing information, the final sample had 9,299 
useable observations (547 firms, 17 years), which makes it a large, unique sample. A total of 
403 firms were affiliated with business groups, while 144 were privately held, unaffiliated 
firms. 
 
Measures and analysis 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable, Financial Performance, is measured as the 
return (profit after tax) on sales, which is otherwise known as ROS. ROS is a commonly used 
financial performance measure for Indian firms. Robustness tests were conducted on other 
performance measures, such as return on assets and return on equity, and the results were 
similar. However, the data for ROS was more complete. 
Independent variables. Affiliation to a business group is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the focal firm belongs to a business group (see Fisman and Khanna, 2004). Business 
groups are particularly diffused in India (Douma, George and Kabir, 2006). Groups are 
usually controlled by a family that sets the strategic direction and manages financial transfers 
among firms. Given the availability of information pertaining to group affiliation, it is 
relatively easy to identify firms belonging to the same group. Furthermore, firms are usually a 
member of only one group and they tend to maintain their affiliation. In addition to the main 
effect of belonging to a business group, we also used an “interaction effect” of “business 
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group * time” by multiplying the business group variable by the number of years in our 
window. The purpose of this variable is to detect changes in the effect of belonging to a 
business group over time. 
Time is a variable measuring the number of years since 1990, which is the year our 
window starts and when the first reforms were conducted in India. The window covers 17 
years (1990-2006), so the time variable take a value of 1 for the year 1990, 2 for the year 
1991, and so on (maximum value is 17 for 2006). This variable measures the amount of time, 
in years, since the reform process started in India. The interaction effect between time and 
other variables is added in order to detect whether the effect of these variables changes over 
time as the reform process begins and becomes more widespread. 
Age is a variable that measures the age of the firm since inception (number of years). In 
addition, we have created an interaction effect “age * time” by multiplying the two variables. 
Service industry is a dummy variable that specifies whether the firm belongs to a service 
industry (value of 1) or to a manufacturing industry (value of 0). The service industries 
include civil engineering, computer software, construction, trading, health, media and 
broadcasting, hotel, business consulting, and business process outsourcing (BPO). We did not 
include financial service firms of any type. In our sample, 77 firms belong to the service 
industry, while 470 firms focus on manufacturing. In order to test hypothesis 4, we created the 
interaction effect “service * time” by multiplying the two variables. 
Control variables. We controlled for firm size and industry, as these factors may have an 
impact on firm performance (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). Firm size is measured as the 
logarithm of total assets in Indian rupees. In addition, all firms are categorized into 28 
industries. In all models, 27 industry dummies are included to control for differences on the 
industry level, such as levels of regulation and entry barriers.  
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We included two other variables to capture the firm’s centrality within individual business 
groups and the group’s diversity. The first measures the firm’s share of group assets, i.e. the 
firm’s assets as a share of the total group assets (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002). It 
is included as a dummy with a value of 1 if the firm’s assets are more than or equal to 25% of 
total group assets and a value of 0 if the firm’s assets are less than 25% of total group assets. 
This variable points to those firms that might be insignificant for the group and therefore may 
not receive the same benefits as other firms in the group. The second variable measures the 
diversity of the group based on the number of industries in which the group is present (e.g. 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000). If the group is present in more than one of the 28 industries, it is 
categorized as diversified with a value of 1. Otherwise, the value is 0. This variable is 
designed to capture the group’s diversity in case firms in more diversified groups benefit 
more than those in non-diversified groups.  
Data analysis. We applied the SAS Procedure TSCSREG (Time-Series, Cross-Section 
Regression) with a variance component model that uses the Fuller-Battese method in the 
estimation (SAS, 1999). In this model, the performance of the model parameters depends on 
the statistical characteristics of the error components in the model. The model has random 
firm and time effects. The random firm effects (which can be thought of as random intercepts) 
correct for correlations between observations for a given firm (over the observed 17 years), 
while the random time effects correct for correlations between observations at the same point 
in time. The random effects reflect the influence of unobserved variables typical of the 
individual firms (such as changes in strategy, like mergers or sell-offs) and points in time 
(such as the market’s yearly fluctuations). 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the performance effects of business group membership given 
institutional changes are tested on a sample that includes all firms. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are 
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tested on a sample that only includes those firms belonging to a business group, as these 
hypotheses focus on variation among business group-affiliated firms.   
 
RESULTS 
The panel estimation results for the models with random time and firm effects are shown in 
Table 1. The table includes four models. A Hausman test was conducted for all four models in 
order to determine whether adding the fixed effects improves the models. The Hausman test 
was insignificant for all four models. This supports the chosen model, which includes random 
firm and time effects, as the alternate model with fixed effects (which take up more degrees of 
freedom) does not perform better than the current model. 
Having established validity for our model, we turn to the results of the estimation given in 
Table 1. In the two first columns, the estimation is conducted over the entire 17 years, while 
the estimations in the third and fourth column are for 1990-1995 and 1996-2006, respectively. 
1990-1995 reflects the early phase of institutional transition in India, while 1996-2006 mirrors 
the late phase of institutional transition.  
Hypothesis 1, on the performance effect of business group membership in the early phase 
of institutional transition, is most directly tested in the third column, where the business group 
variable is shown to be significant (coefficient: 0.13, t=2.15, p < 0.05) and positive, as 
expected. In the three other models (in Table 1), the business group dummy is insignificant. In 
particular, the insignificant parameter for business group in the fourth column (coefficient: -
0.20, t=-0.99, p > 0.10) on the late phase of institutional transition provides evidence for 
hypothesis 2 - the positive performance effect of belonging to a business group levels out as 
the institutional transition progresses. The highly significant and negative interaction effect in 
column 2 (coefficient: -0.04, t=-3.46, p < 0.01) tells the same story - in the context of Indian 
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firms, the advantage of being a member of a business group diminishes from 1990-2006 as 
the institutional transition unfolds.  
 
(Insert here Table 1) 
 
Table 2 only includes estimates for firms belonging to a business group, which allows for a 
test of hypotheses 3 and 4. Both hypotheses are tested simultaneously in the model presented 
in Table 2, which includes the main effects of age and service industry as well as their 
interaction effects with time. The main effect of age is insignificant (coefficient: 0.01, t=0.27, 
p > 0.10), while the interaction effect (age * time) is positive and significant (coefficient: 
0.01, t=2.12, p < 0.05). This indicates that older firms belonging to a business group are better 
able to cope with the new institutional environment in a transition, which is contrary to 
hypothesis 3. For group-affiliated service firms, the main effect, and the interaction between 
service firm and time are highly significant and positive [coefficients: 0.91 (t=3.23) and 0.06 
(t=3.15), respectively, and both p < 0.01]. This signifies that business group-affiliated firms in 
services perform better than those in manufacturing. Furthermore, the gap between these 
firms increased as the institutional transition in India unfolded, as suggested in hypothesis 4. 
In four of the five models, the control variable “logarithm of total assets” is significant (at 
p < 0.01), which implies that size is important. Size consistently has a positive effect on the 
level of performance. The parameters of the 27 industry dummies are not presented in the 
tables. Generally, the industry dummies are insignificant, with 3-5 significant industry 
dummies in each model. This indicates that industry differences are not a major issue in this 
data. However, the control variables referring to the group level, i.e. “share of group” and 
“diversity of group”, are not significant in any of the five models, which indicates that these 
variables have no impact on the performance of Indian firms. 
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(Insert here Table 2) 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our findings contribute to the understanding of the link between firm performance and 
institutional evolution. They show that: (i) business group-affiliated firms outperform 
unaffiliated firms in the early phase of transition, while they lose their advantage in the late 
phase of transition; (ii) the benefits of group membership differ for different member firms; 
and (iii) a time-series, cross-sectional approach may improve the reliability of findings on the 
effects of group membership during institutional transition.  
Group-affiliated firms’ performance during institutional evolution. Theoretical 
contributions and empirical evidence suggest that group-affiliated firms may show superior 
performance in emerging economies (e.g. Chang and Choi, 1988; Keister, 1998; Khanna and 
Palepu, 1999 and 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). The rationale is that labor and product 
markets are characterized by larger imperfections in emerging economies, and that the 
internalization of market transactions may lead to superior performance in these situations 
(Peng, Lee and Wang, 2005).  
Some recent research highlights the possibility that the group effect may decrease over 
time as markets become more efficient (Chang and Hong, 2002; Khanna and Palepu, 2000). 
Our study supports this view and extends it by adding a two-phase longitudinal framework 
(Peng, 2003). Our results show that in early periods of institutional transition, which are 
characterized by market imperfections and weak institutions, group-affiliated firms perform 
better than unaffiliated firms. In subsequent periods characterized by greater market 
efficiency and stronger institutions, group-affiliated firms lose their superior performance. 
Therefore, our findings support and extend the institutional and transaction cost theories of 
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business groups through the analysis of the group effect during the early and the late phases of 
institutional transition. 
The reasoning behind the two-phase model of institutional transition is related to 
environmental and group features. First, there is usually a time lag between the removal of 
restrictive policies and the establishment of effective institutions (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). 
Moreover, the development of market intermediaries in the labor, capital and product markets 
takes time. However, when this development is complete, rule-based interactions are favored 
and relationship-based dealings are undermined (Aoki and Kim, 1995; Khanna and Palepu, 
1999). Second, some empirical studies show that business groups react to the institutional 
transition by taking strategic actions aimed at improving internal efficiency (e.g. Chang and 
Hong, 2000; Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 1999 and 2000; Luo and Chung, 2005). 
These strategies are effective in the short term, but they cannot avoid the leveling-out of 
group-affiliated firms’ performance as the institutional transition unfolds (e.g. Guillen, 2000; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kim et al., 2004; Peng, 2003). Our findings support this two-phase 
model of institutional transition, and encourage governance scholars to investigate the actual 
mechanisms of how changes in the market and institutional environment affect firm 
performance (e.g. Kedia et al., 2006). 
Heterogeneity of group membership benefits for different member firms. Traditional 
literature on business groups rests upon the premise that the benefits and costs of group 
affiliation are shared equally by member firms (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Prior research 
failed to address whether heterogeneity among member firms could influence the 
appropriation of the benefits arising from group affiliation (Kim et al., 2004). The 
conceptualization and empirical analysis of this interesting question are still relatively 
underdeveloped. 
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However, some recent research indicates that the benefits of membership may vary for 
different firms (Kim et al., 2004; Jameson, Sullivan and Constand, 2000). In particular, these 
findings indicate that some members enjoy more benefits than others depending on their 
power-dependence position in the group (Kim et al., 2004; Jameson et al., 2000). Our findings 
also suggest that the benefits of membership vary for different member firms. In fact, our 
results indicate that the influence of the institutional transition on the performance of group-
affiliated firms differs based on the age of the firms and the sector in which they are involved 
(manufacturing versus services). In particular, older firms and service firms are better able to 
cope with institutional transition than younger firms or manufacturing firms belonging to 
business groups. 
The superior performance of group-affiliated service firms during the institutional 
transition is in line with our expectations, while the superior performance of older firms is 
not. Some factors may help explain the unexpected relationship between age and firm 
performance. First, old firms are more experienced, command greater reliability and 
legitimacy, receive the benefits of learning, and are associated with first-mover advantages 
(Douma, George and Kabir, 2006). On the other hand, young affiliated firms do not have 
stable relationships and may have fewer resources (Baum, Calabrese and Silverman, 2000). 
Second, old firms may have higher centrality inside the group and stricter relationships with 
other firms in the group. They may benefit from the strategy of the group to react to new 
environmental conditions, which intensifies existing relationships, and they may be able to 
exploit available group capabilities and resources (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). At the same 
time, young firms may not have a central position in the group or established relationships 
with other group firms. This may negatively affect their performance in a period of 
institutional change or group difficulties. As centrality in the group is not significant, our 
study indicates that some group market and organizational mechanisms may provide more 
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benefits to older companies than younger ones as institutionalization takes place. These 
mechanisms may be represented by social and organizational relationships (e.g. market 
transactions, financial loans, social and family ties) that modify – for some unexplored 
reasons – the effect of institutional transition on member companies. Our findings support the 
idea that the benefits of group membership differ among firms, and we encourage governance 
scholars to further explore the impact of group membership on different types of member 
firms (Kim et al., 2004; Jameson et al., 2000).  
Longitudinal versus cross-sectional studies. Previous work has been criticized because it 
adopted a static approach and was based on cross-sectional data (Newman, 2000). The more 
advanced cross-sectional studies compare the performance effects of business group 
affiliation in a number of emerging economies to explore whether these effects are stable 
across countries (e.g. Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Alternatively, cross-sectional studies 
contrast the performance effects of business group affiliation in emerging and developed 
economies to measure the different effects of group affiliation in the two environments (e.g. 
Chachar and Vissa, 2005). Due to their cross-sectional approach, previous studies failed to 
provide temporal benchmarks for organizational transformations (Newman, 2000). 
The market and the institutional environment in emerging economies evolve over time 
through marginal adjustments and major institutional transitions (e.g. Peng, 2003). Although 
marginal adjustments may not radically change the informal and formal rules of the game, the 
institutional transitions erode existing firms’ routines and competencies (Oliver, 1992; Peng, 
2003) and may undermine the beneficial effects of group affiliation. However, only a few 
studies (e.g. Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna and Palepu, 2000) have investigated the persistence of 
the positive effect of business group affiliation on firm performance over a longitudinal time 
period (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). 
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Our study goes beyond the main criticism of cross-sectional studies, i.e. that they are 
heavily influenced by the sample period (Peng et al., 2005), to analyze the business group 
effect over a long period of institutional transition. We have chosen a long sample period with 
a constant cohort of firms, which allows us to track the dynamics between institution and 
market forces on the one hand, and group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms’ performance on 
the other. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the group effect during the early and 
late phases of institutional transition in India, and we encourage governance scholars to 
investigate the group effect over long periods in other emerging economies (Newman, 2000; 
Peng, 2003).   
Managerial implications. This paper has also implications for practitioners. First, 
managers of business groups should follow the evolution of the institutional environment 
carefully and adapt group characteristics accordingly. As the institutional context evolves, the 
benefits of being affiliated with the group may diminish, and new strategies should be 
developed. Firms failing to adapt to new institutions may find that their fit with old 
institutions is unable to support future performance, and that it may even threaten the firm’s 
survival (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). Second, policy makers should 
focus on the short-term consequences of policies aimed at developing market efficiency. 
Policy makers reshape the business and institutional environments of emerging economies 
through waves of deregulation. In some countries, they have advocated the shrinking of 
business groups to foster efficiency and the welfare of the national economy (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). Our results suggest that although these policies have the desired strong, long-
term effects on the transparency and efficiency of the market, they may undermine the 
efficiency of large national groups and, given the importance of these groups to the national 
economy, of the entire economic system. For this reason, policy makers should evaluate costs 
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and benefits in the short and long terms, and carefully manage the transition of national 
companies and groups from old to new institutional contexts. 
Limitations and future research. We acknowledge that this study has some limitations. 
First, group definition varies substantially across countries, and it is problematic to develop a 
study covering several countries (Khanna, 2000). For this reason, we investigated business 
groups in a single country, i.e. India. India represents an ideal research setting for this study, 
as the economy is dominated by large business groups and group membership is clearly 
defined (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). India is the second-largest emerging economy in the 
world and its growth rate is second only to China (Kedia et al., 2006). Moreover, in the 
1990’s, the Indian government started a process of transitioning to a more liberalized, 
competitive economy. However, our choice may have biased our results because some nation-
specific conditions may have influenced the analysis. Future studies may extend our study to 
cover other countries.  
Second, our research does not develop a deep, first-hand understanding of how the market 
and institutional environment affects the performance of affiliated and unaffiliated firms 
during the two-phase institutional transition. The actual mechanisms behind how the changes 
in the market and institutional environment affect group performance remains largely 
unexplored, as in most previous studies (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001). Future studies could investigate the direct impact of institutional transitions on group 
strategy and performance (Kedia et al., 2006; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). 
Third, following previous studies on business groups in emerging economies (e.g. Chang 
and Choi, 1988; Chang and Hong, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Khanna and Palepu, 
2000; Yiu, Bruton and Lu, 2005), we measured group and firm performance using accounting 
data, i.e. return on sales. The use of accounting measures rather than market-based measures 
is based on data constraints. It is, in fact, difficult to find complete, market-based measures of 
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firm performance in emerging economies. This is especially true if the study covers a large 
sample over a long time period (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Future 
studies may fill this gap by taking advantage of the availability of longer, more complete 
series of market and accounting-based performance data.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Our research investigates the link between firm performance and the evolution of the 
institutional environment in emerging economies. Our findings support institutional and 
transaction cost theories, as they show that: (i) when labor, capital, and products markets are 
characterized by large imperfections and weak supporting institutions – as they are prior to 
institutional transition and in the early-phase of institutional transition – business groups 
outperform independent companies; (ii) when markets become more efficient and institutions 
grow stronger – as they do in the late phase of institutional transition – group-affiliated firms 
fail to show continued superior performance; (iii) heterogeneity among member firms (e.g. 
old versus young firms, manufacturing versus service firms) may influence the appropriation 
of the benefits arising from group affiliation.  
These findings expand the traditional understanding of the relationship between firm 
performance and the institutional context in emerging economies, and provide further support 
for the idea that the relative performance of group-affiliated firms is contingent upon the 
characteristics of the institutional context (i.e. market imperfections and strength of 
supporting institutions) and their particular features (i.e. group versus independent firms and 
other specific features of firms). 
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Notes 
1. Other international business and strategy scholars have used this database to study Indian firms (e.g. 
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002; Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Elango and Pattanaik 2007; Fisman and 
Khanna, 2004) and provided a positive rating of the overall quality and accuracy of this source. 
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Table 1: Panel Estimation with random effects, all firms (547 firms) 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Return on sales (ROS) 
 
Return on sales (ROS) 
 
 All 17 years Year 1990-1995 Year 1996-2006 
 Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant    -0.86* 0.28    -0.87† 0.27  0.03 0.13    -0.76† 0.41 
Business Group  -0.10 0.13  0.11 0.15    0.13* 0.06 -0.20 0.19 
Business Group*time       -0.04** 0.01     
Logarithm of total assets        0.22*** 0.03        0.23*** 0.03 -0.01 0.01        0.32*** 0.05 
Age     0.01* 0.00    0.01† 0.00  0.01 0.01    0.01* 0.00 
Service     0.32† 0.20    0.31† 0.20 -0.08  0.09     0.53† 0.30 
Share of group -0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.07 -0.20 0.22 
Diversity of group  0.12 0.13  0.12 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.20 
Industry dummies Yes  
(27 dummies) 
Yes  
(27 dummies) 
Yes  
(27 dummies) 
Yes  
(27 dummies) 
 
N (firm-years) 
R-square 
Hausman test for random effects 
 
9,299 
0.14 
              24.68*** (2 df) 
 
9,299 
0.15 
              24.40*** (2 df.) 
 
3,282 
0.10 
           7.75* (2 df) 
 
6,017 
  0.16 
              12.90** (2 df.) 
Variance components 
Firm 
Time series 
Error 
 
  0.56 
  0.07 
10.79 
 
  0.56 
  0.02 
10.75 
 
0.02 
0.01 
7.11 
 
  1.35 
  0.02 
11.86 
 
 
†, *, ** and *** are 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels of significance, respectively  
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Table 2: Panel Estimation with random effects, firms belonging to a business group (403 firms) 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Return on sales (ROS)  
All 17 years 
 Coefficient Standard error 
Constant     -0.74** 
 
0.28 
Age   0.01 
 
0.01 
Age*time    0.01* 
 
0.01 
Service      0.91** 
 
0.28 
Service * time      0.06** 
 
0.02 
Logarithm of total assets       0.27*** 
 
0.04 
Share of group -0.13 
 
0.16 
Diversity of group   0.06 
 
0.14 
Industry dummies Yes  
(27 dummies) 
 
N (firm-years) 
R-square 
Hausman test 
 
6,851 
0.15 
              36.44*** (2 df.) 
Variance components 
Firm 
Time series 
Error 
 
0.58 
0.06 
8.36 
 
 
†, *, ** and *** are 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% level of significance, respectively 
 
 
